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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.\1\lERICAN SMELTING & 
REFINING COMPANY, 
-vs-
STATE TAX C0l\1l\1ISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10084 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the State Tax 
Commission of Utah. The question presented is whether or 
not the claim for refund of plantiff, American Smelting & 
Hefining Company, of a portion of its 1956 Utah franchise 
tax is barred by the statute of limitations, Section 59-13-43, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION 
The Tax Commission refused to grant the plaintiff's 
claim for refund, holding that it was barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commission's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, American Smelting & Refining Company, 
is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State 
of New Jersey, and is qualified to transact business in the 
State of Utah. 
On December 31, 1956 the company requested an ex-
tension of time, until October 15, 1957, in which to file its 
consolidated franchise tax return and pay the tax for the 
calendar year ending December 31, 1956. The return was 
due April15, 1957. On January 7, 1957 the Tax Commission 
granted the taxpayer an extension of time to October 15, 
1957 as requested by the taxpayer to pay the tax. Such 
extension was for six months as provided under Section 
59-13-25(2) U.C.A. 1953. Subsequently, the taxpayer paid 
the tax as follows: April 10, 1957, $11,000.00; June 7, 1957, 
$11,000.00; September 11, 1957, $8,000.00; October 14, 1957, 
$5,631.44. The total tax due on the company's return filed 
October 14, 1957 was $35,631.44. 
The company's federal income tax return for 1956 was 
adjusted by the Internal Revenue Service on September 
16, 1960, which, if promptly accounted for on its 1956 Utah 
franchise tax return, would have permitted a refund from 
the State Tax Comn1ission to the taxpayer of $695.30, to-
gether with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per 
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(lnnum. The taxpayer then filed a claim for refund with 
the State Tax Commission of Utah on the 25th day of No-
vember. 1960. The time elapsed between the date of the 
l~&st payment, made on October 14, 1957, to the date of 
filing for a refund on November 25, 1960, was three years, 
one month and ten days. 
The taxpayer made no agreement with the U. S. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue for an extension of the 
period for proposing and assessing deficiences in its Feder-
al Income Tax for the taxable year 1956. (R 27) 
The rlaim for refund was denied by the State Tax 
Commission after a formal hearing before the Tax Commis-
sion on January 9, 1964. 
The plaintiff contended that the statute did not begin 
to run until after that time, or in other words, until Decem-
ber 15, 1957, the last day of the 1957 fourth quarter. 
The defendant denied plaintiff's claim, holding that 
the three year statute of limitation for claiming refund had 
run from the time the last payment was made, as that was 
the date the taxpayer had agreed to make its last payment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
\VHERE .A TAXPAYER PAYS THE TAX, THE 
'l'HREE ·yE_-\R STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR RE-
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FUND BEGINS TO RUN FROM THE TIME THE TAX 
WAS "PAID." 
The section in 59-13-43, U.C.A. 1953, dealing with the 
time limitation for credits and refunds, reads af follows: 
59-13-43(2)(a). "No such credit or refund shall be 
allowed or made after three years from the time the 
tax was paid, unless before the expiration of such 
period a claim therefor is filed with the tax com-
mission by the taxpayer." (Emphasis added.) 
The section relied on by the Tax Commission to bar 
plaintiff's claim for refund is Section 2(a) above, "No such 
refund shall be allowed or made after three years from the 
time the tax was paid ... " 
Plaintiff's claim for refund was made three years, one 
month and ten days from the time the last payment was 
made on the tax. 
In the excellent work of Cooley, Taxation, Vol. 3, 4th ed., 
Sec. 1304, p. 2593, Statute of Limitations, it states: 
"The time allowed for bringing the action is 
generally fixed by statute ... As the cause of action 
accrues at the time of payment, the statute of limi-
tations begins to run from that time, even though 
the illegality may not have been known." (Emphas-
sis added.) 
F1ootnote cites Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab Co., 
22 Utah 396, 62 Pac. 1024. 
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Further, as stated in 84 C.J.S., p. 1298: 
"If there are special statutes of limitation ap-
plicable to actions for the recovery of taxes paid, 
and such statutes are valid, the action is barred 
unless brought within the prescribed time after the 
cause of action has accrued ... " 
And. page 2594: 
" ... Except insofar as statutes may otherwise 
provide. the limitation period generally runs from 
the time the taxes are paid, and is not postponed 
until the legality of the tax has been judicially de-
termined, or the taxpayer discovers that the assess-
ment, levy and collection were illegal. .. " 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Centennial case, cited above, states on page 404: 
"'When a party pays an unlawful tax under 
protest, a cause of action ... at once accrues in 
favor of such party to recover such tax; the statute 
of limitations begins to run from the date of such 
payment . .. " (Emphasis added.) 
.And a follow-up case, citing the Centennial case, supra, 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Matson et al., 64 Utah 214, 228 
Pac. 755, is directly in point. In that case the plaintiff com-
pany paid a tax on the privilege of dealing in trading 
stamps betweenJ January 1, 1916 and January 1, 1917. The 
Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 
563. 200 Pac. 894, subsequently determined this tax uncon-
stitutional. The plaintiff in that case contended that the 
statute of limitations did not begin to run when the tax 
\Yas paid but when the H oltgreve case determined the stat-
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ute unconstitutional. In reply to this, the court in the 
Sperry case held, on pages 218 and 219: 
"We dismiss without comment the contention 
of the plaintiff that the cause of action did not be-
gin to run until the statute was declared unconsti-
tutional in the Holtgreve case in September, 1921. 
Plaintiff says it did not know the statute was un-
constitutional until it was declared to be so in the 
Holtgreve case ... The contention on its face has 
the appearance of being sham and disingenuous. 
In any event, the ti1ne in w hie h to commence the 
action began to run when the money teas paid to 
the officer." (Emphasis added.) 
The court said further, at p. 220, that "the proposition is 
so utterly untenable as to be undeserving of extended com-
ment." Also see Raleigh v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 130, 
53 Pac. 974, and Neilson v. Sanpete County, 40 Utah 560, 
123 Pac. 334. 
POINT II 
WHERE A TAXPAYER DOES NOT FILE ITS RE-
r-1,URN OR PAY ITS UTAH FRANCHISE TAX ON TIME, 
.A.N EXTENSION MAY BE GRANTED BY THE TAX 
COMMISSION FOR SIX MONTHS, BUT NOT FOR FOUR 
QUARTERS, UNDER SECTION 59-13-25(2), U.c·.A. 1953. 
The plaintiff's brief in paragraph 3 of its statement of 
facts misstates the facts and the law in the case. Plaintiff 
contends it elected to pay the franchise tax in four quarter-
ly installments as provided in Section 59-13-25(1), U.C.A. 
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1953. The statement is misleading and incorrect. Plaintiff 
could not and did not so elect to pay the tax. 
Section 59-13-25( 1) permits a taxpayer who has filed 
" return by April 15th following the taxable year to pay 
his tax in four quarterly installments. The plaintiff did not 
file a return on that date because it could not. Instead, it 
requested an extension of time to file the return;, which 
extension was granted by the defendant, pursuant to a 
different section of the Code, Section 59-13-25(2), U.C.A. 
1953. 
Section 59-13-25(2) gives the Tax Commission author-
ity to grant an extension of time of payment: 
··Extension of Time of Payment. 
(2) At the request of the taxpayer, the tax 
commission may extend the time for payment of 
the amount determined as the tax by the taxpayer, 
or any part thereof, for a period not to exceed 
six months from the date prescribed for the pay-
ment of the ta.x. In such case the amount in respect 
of ""hich the extension is granted shall be paid on 
or before the date of the expiration of the period of 
the extension.'' 
The appellant's request for an extension is as follows 
(H. 66): 
''We hereby request an extension of time to 
October 15, 1957 irr which to file our Consolidated 
Franchise Tax Return for the calendar year 1956 
covering the American Smelting and Refining Com-
pany. Federated Metals Corporation (Pennsylvania) 
and Lone Star Lead Construction Corporation. This 
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request for extension is necessary because the in-
formation to complete the Return will not be avail-
able to enable us to file before the requested exten-
sion date." 
The Tax Commission granted this request by form 
letter dated January 7, 1957, which said letter stated 
(R.67): 
"In compliance with your request, your are 
hereby granted an extension of time to October 15, 
1957 within which to file your corporation franchise 
tax return and pay any tax due for the taxable year 
ended December 31, 1956." 
It is obvious from the language of the plaintiff's letter 
that their return could not be filed on time. And without 
such a filing, no formal payments could be made. Because 
the taxpayer in fact paid at four different times, it does 
not follow that these were quarterly installments. Under 
the extension, the tax could have been paid in one install-
ment or fifty, but all of it was to have been paid before 
October 15, 1957. Therefore, the due date of the tax was 
October 15, 1957 and not at the end of of the 1957 fourth 
quarter as alleged by the plaintiff. 
In fact, the Tax Commission had no statutory author-
ity to grant an extension for the length of time plaintiff 
claims it was entitled, i.e., four quarters, under Section 
59-13-25. Plaintiff by so claiming is attempting to repudiate 
its own extension agreement. Its 1956 tax and return was 
due on April 15, 1957. The only way it could avoid a pen-
alty and interest for failure to file on that date was to ob-
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tain a courtesy extension, which it did. However, plaintiff 
could not as a matter of right file at a later date without 
the extension. Now plaintiff wants the advantage of the 
extension to avoid the interest and penalty for failure to 
file on time, but doesn't want the resulting disadvantage 
which accrues when its refund is denied by the statute 
of limitations. Therefore, under this reasoning, the plaintiff 
has an alternative: either the statute of limitations applies 
and its claim for refund of $695.00 is denied, or it repudi-
ates its extension agreement and is liable in the amount of 
S 11.043.86 penalty and interest for failure to file and p:1y 
the tax on time. See Sections 59-13-27 and 59-13-30(1)(a). 
POINT III 
WHERE A TAXPAYER FILES A REPORT OF 
CHANGE OR CORRECTION OF FEDERAL INCOME 
'l'AX AFTER THE UTAH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
F'OR REFUND HAS RUN, SECTION 59-13-40, U.C.A. 
1953, PROVIDING FOR A SUSPENSION OF THE STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATIONS IS INAPPLICABLE. 
Section 59-13-40, U.C.A. 1953, is totally inapplicable to 
the instant case. This section in essence provides that a 
taxpayer whose net income is "changed" or "corrected" 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue can file a report 
of such change or correction with the State Tax Commis-
sion within 90 days therefrom. But if such report is not 
filed, then the taxpayer is not entitled to the 90-day re-
assessment period. 
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In the instant case, American Smelting cannot claim 
the statute. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue adjust-
ed its 1956 tax on September 16, 1960, 28 days before the 
Utah statute of limitations for a refund had run. Then, the 
taxpayer filed a claim for a refund with defendant on No-
vember 25, 1960, 70 days after the federal government 
adjusted its tax, and 42 days after the Utah statute of lim-
itation had run on its claim for refund. 
Therefore, the plaintiff is barred as a matter of law 
from claiming the advantage of Section 59-13-40, U.C.A. 
1953. 
CONCLUSION 
The American Smelting & Refining Company's claim 
for refund is barred by the statute of limitations. The stat-
ute began to run upon payment by the taxpayer as it did 
in the Centennial, Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab Co., 22 Utah 
396, 62 Pac. 1024, and Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Mat-
son et al., 64 Utah 214, 228 Pac. 755 cases, supra, and as its 
claim was not submitted within the three year period, the 
State Tax Commission is now without the power to grant 
plaintiff relief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT !{ESLER, 
Attorney General 
DEL B. ROWE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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